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free education, disestablishment, land tenure reforms, payment of members of parliament, improvement of laborers' dwellings, etc.

Mr. Jeyes' book is an interesting sketch of political movements in Great Britain during the last two decades. These movements are necessarily the background for his delineation of Mr. Chamberlain's political career, and in the main he allows the reader to draw his own inferences.

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Democracy and Liberty. By W. E. HARTPOLE LECKY. 2 Vols., pp. 1169. Price, \$5.00. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1896.

The announcement that we were to have an exhaustive analysis of democracy in its relation to liberty, from the pen of Mr. Lecky, had led us to expect a philosophical examination of that movement, which, perhaps, best characterizes the nineteenth century. To many students of politics the two volumes published under the above title will be a great disappointment. Instead of the expected philosophic work, we have been given a collection of notes which bear the appearance of a political handbook. While the author does not expressly identify himself with any of the great parties—his treatment of many questions occupying a middle position between the extremes of English political thought—the two volumes on “Democracy and Liberty” might well be adopted by the right wing of what was the Liberal Party before 1836, as their contribution to the collection of “Handbooks for Electors.” Viewed in this light the ten chapters into which Mr. Lecky's work is divided, might be a valuable aid to the intelligent citizen in search of facts. Had the work been received in this spirit in England and America, a lengthy examination of the author's views would hardly be necessary. It would occupy a place—and a most honorable one—amongst handbooks on practical political problems.

That this has not been the case is evident from the comments of the English periodical and daily press. Coming at a time when the extreme liberal or radical element in English politics has fallen into disfavor, when a conservative wave is sweeping over the country, the book is regarded by many as the summing up of the achievements of democracy and a fair account of the part which this form of government—for it is only as a form of government that the author regards democracy—is likely to play in the immediate future.

Whatever the author may have intended, the spirit in which the book has been received is likely to be productive of much harm, not

only in distorting the views of large classes as to the nature of democracy, but, what is probably far worse, in further confusing the notion of individual liberty—a notion none too clear at the present time.

The author's conception of democracy means nothing more than a "form of government." That it represents a stage in social evolution, an evolution which has found most distinct expression in the changes of governmental forms, is a thought entirely foreign to the work. The greater part, if not all, of the splendid results of recent research and scientific analysis which point out the difference between social development and political forms, is ignored. Democracy means primarily the democratic evolution of society. Democratic forms of government are the necessary results of such an evolution and cannot be judged simply as political devices. It was inevitable that the industrial and social changes of the present century should have brought with them the participation of an ever-increasing proportion of the population in the political life of the countries of western civilization. That this involves a change in the form of the state, in the nature of its problems, and in the seat of sovereignty, is equally clear; but these facts are scarcely hinted at. Government by the ignorant, unpropertied masses seems to summarize most accurately the author's view of the meaning of democracy. The broader aspects of the problem are equally ignored. The higher concept of social duty due to the broadening of political ideals, the growth of common national standards of right and wrong, the view that the state represents something more than a few wire-pulling individuals who direct affairs, are questions which find no place in the author's discussions. In speaking of Plato's political ideas, Jowett has said, "the magnificent treatment of the relation between the nature of the state and the nature of the individual" constitutes their lasting value. Judged by this standard, the present work has utterly failed to give an adequate treatment of the subject. It is the lack of this method that explains the absence of philosophic breadth of view and scientific depth of treatment. Whatever may be our attitude toward the democratic movement, we have advanced beyond the stage of regarding it as the rule of poverty over wealth and of ignorance over intelligence.

The author's antipathy to democratic tendencies is stamped on every page. The failure of democracy to solve any of the great problems of political or economic policy is the burden of his song. A special plea might be presented that the magnitude of the new problems of social legislation and the suddenness with which they have been thrust upon us, should be admitted as an extenuating circumstance; that these problems would have arisen and presented similar, if not greater difficulties, under any form of government. Mr. Lecky's

intimate acquaintance with the eighteenth century should have deterred him from making the many comparisons unfavorable to the nineteenth. Applying the Spencerian standard that "institutions are to be judged by their effect upon character"—a standard which the author impliedly accepts, the case against democracy is surely not as hopeless as eight of the ten chapters would lead us to suppose. His own previous publications furnish abundant material to show that the national sensitiveness to social wrongs, the higher concepts of social duty are products of the present century. All the sciences—the political and economic are pervaded with this new spirit. Rights and wrongs, utilities and disutilities, have come to be regarded from the standpoint of society rather than from that of the individual.

When we examine the author's views on the nature of liberty we find the same atmosphere as in his discussion of democracy. No conscious attempt is made to bring the two notions into direct relation one with the other, although the inferences to be drawn from the analysis of each are unmistakable. The absolute right to do as one chooses as long as direct physical interference with one's neighbor is avoided, is an idea which for some time has been relegated to the lumber-room of politics. Recent writers have very generally recognized that with the increasing complexity of economic conditions and relations, increased restriction upon individual activity in certain directions would become necessary. This does not necessarily imply a decrease in the actual content of such liberty. On the contrary, it means that to assure orderly and continuous social progress, new restraints must be established whenever and wherever old customs and habits are in conflict with new conditions. The rapid growth of large cities and the great mass of police regulations thereby rendered necessary, are sufficient proof of this fact. The degradation of large classes due to the lack of such regulations is one of the undisputed facts in the history of English municipal institutions. That this tendency has in no sense endangered individual liberty, but has tended to elevate the moral tone of the community and with it the potential freedom of the working classes, is hardly less evident. The experience of the last two decades has shown the immense educative value of such regulations. The legislation of England and America in this respect, and the growth of equity jurisprudence in both countries are exceedingly instructive in this connection. They are both distinct expressions of the transition from a negative to a more positive view of the authority of the community. In England this transition occurred later than in most of the countries of Western Europe, and when made, the conditions had already reached a point

where state regulation and supervision could no longer be fully effective. With the sudden extension of state and particularly municipal activity, many weaknesses were bound to show themselves. To rehouse the poor, to reconstruct whole cities, to introduce drainage, etc., were gigantic problems. The author has looked at but one side of the question, viz., the restrictions on individual activity which this involves. Its great social importance has escaped him.

But disregarding for the moment the question of the dangers of such increasing restrictions, we are brought to the central thought of the book—or at least what one would expect to be the central thought of the book, viz., the relation of liberty to democracy. In this the author gives us a classic instance of intellectual gymnastics. He has observed two movements going hand in hand—advancing democracy and increasing restrictions on individual action. Without any discussion as to the relation between the two, they are connected as cause and effect.

To this kind of reasoning one might very well reply that increased regulation does not necessarily imply decrease of liberty, and that under any form of government, or in any stage of social evolution in which great industrial changes have taken place, such as those of the present century, increased regulation would be necessary. Whether for good or evil, these regulations must not be charged to democracy, but to the changed conditions of social life. It is only fair to say that in treating concrete labor problems the author takes far more kindly to state regulation than in his theoretical discussions.

As a result of viewing democracy from its purely political side, and from but a portion of that combined with a mechanical theory of individual liberty, we are given no definite conclusions as to the nature and functions of the state and the real meaning of individual liberty, nor are we given any clue as to where the unhealthy development of both, which the author seems to take for granted, is to lead society.

In order to give some idea of the method of treating concrete problems let us take one or two involving the economic and political ideas of the author.

Of the former the most characteristic, illustrating Mr. Lecky's ideas both of democracy and liberty, is his treatment of taxation. In his premises he agrees entirely with Mr. Spencer that increasing taxation means a restriction of freedom by lessening the portion of individual earnings that may be expended as one chooses. To bring this question into relation with advancing democracy, the author endeavors to show that the purse-strings being in the hands of unpropertied classes, the willingness to incur large expenditure is almost unlimited. From this he concludes that democracy "means a constant increase of taxation which is in reality a constant restriction of liberty. One of the

first forms of liberty is the right of every man to dispose of his own property and earnings, and every tax is a portion of this money taken from him by the force and authority of the law. Taxation under a democracy is likely to take forms that are peculiarly hostile to liberty." * We have here the mediæval concept of taxation; a quota taken by force and for which there is little if any return. The historical fact that in the modern state increasing taxation has gone hand in hand with highly productive forms of public expenditure does not enter into the author's financial theories. It is hardly necessary to add that in these views Mr. Lecky finds himself at complete variance with all modern writers on finance. From the same premise of government by the unpropertied classes, the author is led to the conclusion that as the masses begin to realize that by a mere majority vote all financial obligations may be discharged, the legislative doctrine of the repudiation of public debts is likely to find an increasing number of adherents.

Another instance of the economic views of the author is to be found in his treatment of labor problems. Without any analysis of the economic relations involved, we are assured that "with an intelligent and provident working class the 'living wage' and the 'just wage' will be easily reached through the improved conditions of the market." †

Throughout the discussion of economic problems a negative attitude in treating questions of principle is apparent. A complete system of politics is summarized in the statement that "Society is a compact, chiefly for securing to each man a peaceful possession of his property," ‡ and as long as a man fulfills his part in the social compact his right to do what he wills with his inherited property—or for that matter any property which he may own—is not to be disputed.

When we examine Mr. Lecky's political views, the most characteristic factor is an unconquerable distrust of representative institutions, especially the growing ascendancy of the more popular branch of national legislatures. In fact, the chapter on this question is opened with the statement that "Of all forms of government that are possible among mankind, I do not know of any which is likely to be worse than the government of a single, omnipotent, democratic chamber." § It is this sentiment which is taken as the standard by which to judge the development of political institutions in Europe and America.

* Vol. i, p. 258.

† Vol. ii, p. 433.

‡ Vol. ii, p. 501.

§ Vol. i, p. 361.

With regard to the English Parliament the author finds much cause for complaint. He finds the model Parliaments in a period prior to the extension of the suffrage, and dates the decline of the House of Commons from such extension. The participation of an increasing proportion of the population in the political life of the country is given no social significance. In fact, it means nothing more than the injection of a great mass of ignorance into the body politic. "Nothing in ancient alchemy was more irrational than the notion that increased ignorance in the elective body will be converted into increased capacity for good government in the representative body." * This is bringing politics back to its old status of an analysis of purely governmental relations. The reaction of the governing on the governed, the political consciousness which this participation must develop in all classes of society, and the higher meaning which the state must acquire thereby, are factors which are completely disregarded. In placing the emphasis on the dangers which this extension of suffrage brings with it, the author is led to favor any device which will check the effective expression of the national will in positive legislation. He is thus led to favor a written constitution for Great Britain in order to secure property rights. In this the fact is apparently lost sight of that in another portion of the book the indifference to political life, which is characteristic of the well-to-do classes in America, is ascribed to the constitutional guarantees of property and liberty. The conclusions of the author are not surprising, however, when we stop to consider that his view of the state is that of a commercial corporation instituted for purposes of protection. From these criticisms it must not be inferred that the work of Mr. Lecky is devoid of all value. It contains a great mass of interesting information. Nor do all the chapters show the defects which we have had occasion to point out. On three points especially the author's treatment is extremely lucid and satisfactory. In the discussion of the position of the church in the modern state, a remarkably clear appreciation of the relative importance of different religious forces is shown. The description of the position of woman in modern society shows the results of much careful thought and keen observation. Educational questions are also treated in a very much broader spirit than most of the other problems.

The note of warning which sounds throughout the book is not without value, but this would have been greatly increased had the author been more careful to keep the note clear and in harmony with recent scientific research. The experience of the present century is not of a kind to warrant the monotonously pessimistic conclusions

* Vol. i, p. 26.

which he has reached. Through this narrow view of democracy and his mechanical theory of liberty, Mr. Lecky has considerably diminished the value of his sermon to the democracy of the twentieth century.

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Nouveau Dictionnaire de Géographie Universelle. Contenant : 1° *La Géographie Physique* ; 2° *La Géographie Politique* ; 3° *La Géographie Économique* ; 4° *L'Ethnologie* ; 5° *La Géographie Historique* ; 6° *La Bibliographie.* Ouvrage commencé par VIVIEN DE SAINT-MARTIN, et continué par LOUIS ROUSSELET. 1879-1894. Seven volumes. Pp. I., 850; II, 1008; III, 1078; IV, 1052; V, 999; VI, 998; VII, 565. Price, 205 fr. Suppléments 1-2-3, each 80 pp. AA-Balkans. Price of each supplement 2 fr. 50c. Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie.

The mere magnitude of such a work as the "*Nouveau Dictionnaire de Géographie Universelle*" must command the wonder of every one who examines the seven ponderous quarto volumes. In these seven volumes of about 1000 pages each, is contained as much material as could be put into something over 100 octavo volumes of 500 pages each, 350 words to a page. The first volume of the dictionary appeared in 1879 and the seventh was completed in 1894. The preparatory work must have antedated the appearance of the first volume by several years, so that it is no exaggeration to say that it is the product of twenty-five years of scientific labor. The editor down to 1890 was M. Vivien de Saint-Martin. His chief associate was M. Louis Rousselet, to whom the editorship fell when old age rendered M. Saint-Martin incapable of carrying on the work. Associated with these two geographers in the undertaking, was a large number of the scholars of France who are specialists in geography and in allied sciences. Besides the editor-in-chief no less than six of the most zealous collaborators died before the completion of the final volume.

The plan followed by the editors in constructing this Dictionary of Geography has not been to include a notice of all known places. In general, places with a population of less than 1000 have been omitted; deviations from this rule, however, have been frequently made whenever the importance of a place of less than 1000 inhabitants was unusually great because of historical reasons. Having thus limited within reasonable bounds the number of places noticed, the editors gave to each of the important countries and states of the world as complete a treatment as could be gotten within the space of an ordinary sized volume. A monograph has been devoted to each important